An Informational Role of Supermajority Rules in Monitoring the Majority Party's Activities
An Informational Role of Supermajority Rules in Monitoring the Majority Party's Activities
复制标题
绝对多数规则在监督多数党活动中的信息作用
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12331
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Daiki Kishishita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daiki Kishishita
通常存在绝对多数规则，使少数党能够推迟或阻止对法案的投票。我构建了一个由代表性选民、自利政党和媒体机构组成的两期模型。在该模型中，多数党有动机歪曲选民的最优政策。我表明，少数党试图阻止投票（例如，阻挠议事）可以表明这种歪曲。有趣的是，关键是少数党和大众媒体在制造信号方面是互补的。总的来说，结果表明，即使对大多数选民来说，绝对多数规则也可能是有益的。
There often exists a supermajority rule that enables the minority party to delay or prevent a vote on a bill. I construct a two‐period model consisting of a representative voter, self‐interested parties, and a media outlet. In the model, the majority party has an incentive to misrepresent the voter's optimal policy. I show that the minority party's attempt to block a vote (e.g., a filibuster) can signal this misrepresentation. Interestingly, the key is that the minority party and the mass media are complementary in creating the signal. Overall, the results suggest that supermajority rules could be beneficial even for the majority of voters.