Causal Reasoning About Human Behavior Genetics: Synthesis and Future Directions
Causal Reasoning About Human Behavior Genetics: Synthesis and Future Directions
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DOI：
10.1007/s10519-018-9909-z
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发表时间：
2019-03-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Griffiths, Paul E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lynch, Kate E.;Morandini, James S.;Griffiths, Paul E.
在解释人类行为的原因时，基因常常被赋予特殊的地位。它们被认为与人类内在的本质有关，而本质主义的偏见已经被证明扭曲了评估因果关系的方式。一般来说，因果推理受制于其他预先存在的偏见，包括对规范性和道德的信念。在这个综合中，我们展示了影响因果推理的因素如何可以映射到遗传本质主义的框架，这揭示了在因果推理和遗传本质主义中支持偏见的共同和独特的因素。这种比较确定了被忽视的研究领域，这些领域可以提供富有成效的调查，例如对行为的规范性评估是否会影响遗传原因的归属或认可方式。我们还概述了区分关于遗传因果影响对自己和他人的推理过程的重要性，因为不同的认知过程和偏见可能在起作用。
When explaining the causes of human behavior, genes are often given a special status. They are thought to relate to an intrinsic human essence', and essentialist biases have been shown to skew the way in which causation is assessed. Causal reasoning in general is subject to other pre-existing biases, including beliefs about normativity and morality. In this synthesis we show how factors which influence causal reasoning can be mapped to a framework of genetic essentialism, which reveals both the shared and unique factors underpinning biases in causal reasoning and genetic essentialism. This comparison identifies overlooked areas of research which could provide fruitful investigation, such as whether normative assessments of behaviors influence the way that genetic causes are ascribed or endorsed. We also outline the importance of distinguishing reasoning processes regarding genetic causal influences on one's self versus others, as different cognitive processes and biases are likely to be at play.