Job displacement, disability, and divorce

Job displacement, disability, and divorce
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DOI:
10.1086/381258
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发表时间:
2004-04-01
影响因子:
3.8
通讯作者:
Stephens, M
Stephens, M
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Charles, KK;Stephens, M

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收入冲击应该通过改变夫妻对婚姻的预期收益来影响离婚概率。我们发现,离婚风险上升后,配偶的工作位移,但不会改变后,配偶残疾。这一差异使人们对收入冲击后离婚的纯粹金钱动机产生怀疑,因为这两种冲击表现出类似的长期经济后果。此外,离婚率的增加只出现在裁员的情况下,而不是工厂关闭的情况下,这表明,在促成离婚方面,由于失业而导致的伴侣不适合作为配偶的信息可能比经济损失更重要。
Earnings shocks should affect divorce probability by changing a couple's expected gains from marriage. We find that the divorce hazard rises after a spouse's job displacement but does not change after a spousal disability. This difference casts doubt on a purely pecuniary motivation for divorce following earnings shocks, since both types of shocks exhibit similar long-run economic consequences. Furthermore, the increase in divorce is found only for layoffs and not for plant closings, suggesting that information conveyed about a partner's noneconomic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more important than financial losses in precipitating divorce.