Delegated Testing of Design Alternatives: The Role of Incentives and Testing Strategy
Delegated Testing of Design Alternatives: The Role of Incentives and Testing Strategy
复制标题
设计方案的委托测试：激励和测试策略的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3020025
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Jochen Schlapp
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gerrit Schumacher;Jochen Schlapp
设计测试是几乎所有新产品开发活动的一个组成部分，因为它使公司能够为他们的新产品确定最佳设计。测试结果通常由专家（团队）收集，必须激励他们不仅要努力测试设计，还要如实报告他们的发现。出于这种普遍的挑战，我们解决以下问题：一个公司应该如何设置其设计测试过程，以便（i）专家有足够的激励，更重要的是，（ii）最好的设计方案是最有可能被选中？我们通过设计一个（委托）设计测试过程的正式模型来回答这些问题。我们的分析确定了公司的最佳测试策略和最佳激励结构，它也揭示了如何，确切地说，授权扭曲了公司的测试过程。
Design testing is an integral part of nearly all new product development initiatives because it enables firms to identify the best designs for their new products. Test results are usually collected by (teams of) experts, who must be incentivized not only to exert effort in testing the designs but also to report their findings truthfully. Motivated by this widespread challenge, we address the following questions: How should a firm set up its design-testing process so that (i) the experts are adequately incentivized and, more importantly, (ii) the best design alternative is the one most likely to be selected? We answer these questions by devising a formal model of a (delegated) design-testing process. Our analysis identifies the firm’s optimal testing strategy and the optimal incentive structures; it also reveals how, exactly, delegation distorts a firm’s testing process.