Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility
Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility
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拥有绝对多数投票权的委员会可以做出灵活的承诺
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.05.001
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Ernesto Dal Bó
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ernesto Dal Bó
政府面临的一个根本问题是，如何将对某些政策的承诺与必要时调整政策所需的灵活性联合收割机结合起来。罗格夫（1985）[罗格夫，K.，1985.对一个中间货币目标的最优承诺度Q。100（4）1169-1189]表明，取得正确平衡的一种方法是任命一个最佳的“保守”决策者。然而，在真实的生活中，政策制定者也有权做出最优计划与时间一致的决策，因此将权力下放给保守的人可能是不可取的。一个灵活的授权机制可以在一个由随机任命的成员组成的大型委员会中找到，这些成员在观察到一次冲击后对政策进行投票。当面临动态不一致时，在单交叉性质下，存在绝对多数规则，确定性地实现了总体中位数的最优保守决策者。另一个单交叉性质保证，如果简单多数投票被用来选择将支配政策选择的投票规则，那么选择中位数偏好的绝对多数。对于动态不一致性消失的问题，委员会将选择以简单多数做出决定，实现中间结果。货币政策的应用程序开发。我们发现，最优的绝对多数是更高的动态不一致性更严重时，偏好更均匀，当经济波动较小。
A fundamental problem for government is how to combine commitment to certain policies with the flexibility required to adjust them when needed. Rogoff (1985) [Rogoff, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Q. J. Econ. 100(4) 1169–1189] showed that a way to strike the right balance is to appoint an optimally “conservative” policy-maker. In real life, however, policy-makers also have power over decisions where optimal plans are time-consistent, so delegating to a conservative person could be undesirable. A flexible delegation device can be found in a large committee of randomly appointed members voting over policy after observing a shock. When facing dynamic inconsistency, under a single-crossing property, there exists a supermajority rule that implements the population median's optimally conservative policy-maker with certainty. Another single-crossing property guarantees that if simple majority voting is used to select the voting rule that will govern policy choice, the supermajority preferred by the median is chosen. For problems where dynamic inconsistency vanishes, the committee will choose to make decisions by simple majority, implementing median outcomes. An application to monetary policy is developed. We show that the optimal supermajority is higher when dynamic inconsistency is more severe, when preferences are more homogeneous, and when the economy is less volatile.