Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers
Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers
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DOI：
10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00023-5
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发表时间：
2002-12-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Bishop, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bishop, M
本文提出的最初论点并不是原创性的--它是对最初由普特南（Putnam，1988年;另见Searle，1990年）提出并受到查尔默斯等人批评的计算概念的简单反思（查尔默斯，1994年，1996年a，B;另见特刊，什么是计算？，in Minds and Machines，4：4，November 1994）.在下文中，我将建立一个较弱的结果，即在有限的时间窗口内，每个开放系统在输入（1）上执行程序（P）时实现FSA Q的踪迹，而不是试图证明普特南的结论，即每个开放系统实现每个有限状态自动机（FSA），因此大脑的心理状态不可能是计算机的功能状态。如果正确的话，由此产生的大胆的哲学主张是，现象状态，如感觉和视觉经验，永远不能被理解或解释功能。(C)2002 Elsevier Science（美国）。All rights reserved.
The initial argument presented herein is not significantly original-it is a simple reflection upon a notion of computation originally developed by Putnam (Putnam, 1988; see also Searle, 1990) and criticised by Chalmers et al. (Chalmers, 1994, 1996a,b; see also the special issue, What is Computation?, in Minds and Machines, 4:4, November 1994). In what follows, instead of seeking to justify Putnam's conclusion that every open system implements every Finite State Automaton (FSA) and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system implements the trace of FSA Q, as it executes program (P) on input (1). If correct the resulting bold philosophical claim is that phenomenal states-such as feelings and visual experiences-can never be understood or explained functionally. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.