Impact of ｒisk aversion and countervailing tax in oligopoly
Impact of ｒisk aversion and countervailing tax in oligopoly
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寡头垄断中风险规避和反补贴税的影响
DOI：
10.1007/s10436-016-0285-5
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Jim Jin and Shinji Kobayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
二村真理子;Jim Jin and Shinji Kobayashi
文献认识到风险规避对寡头垄断市场绩效的定性影响，但对其幅度知之甚少。我们定量评估这些影响古诺和贝特朗寡头企业最大化的均值方差效用下的线性需求和成本。这两种寡头垄断的影响非常相似，但有相反的迹象。企业的风险规避对产出、价格、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响可以通过潜在的可观察变量来表达。由于这些影响类似于企业成本变化的影响，监管者可以通过适当的补偿税来改变企业的成本，从而减少或消除风险规避的不良影响。
The literature recognizes the qualitative effects of risk aversion on oligopolistic market performance, but less is known about their magnitudes. We quantitatively evaluate these effects in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies where firms maximize mean-variance utilities under linear demand and costs. The impacts are very similar for the two types of oligopoly, but have opposite signs. The impacts of a firm’s risk aversion on outputs, prices, consumer surplus and social welfare can be expressed via potentially observable variables. Since these impacts resemble the effects of firms’ cost changes, a regulator can reduce or eliminate undesirable effects of risk aversion by changing firms’ costs with appropriate countervailing taxes.