Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality
复制标题
有限理性的重复拥塞博弈
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Tristan Tomala
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Scarsini;Tristan Tomala
我们考虑在监控不完善的情况下进行重复的拥塞博弈。在每个阶段，每个玩家都会选择使用一些设施，并支付随着拥堵而增加的成本。研究了模型的两个版本：公共监控设置，代理观察每个可用设施的成本；私人监控设置，玩家仅观察他们使用的设施的成本。一个部分民间定理成立：帕累托最优结果可能源于自私行为，并通过重复博弈的无信念均衡来维持。我们假设参与者使用有限复杂性的策略来证明这个结果，并且我们估计了实现效率所需的策略复杂性。结果表明，在一定的玩家数量和游戏结构的条件下，即使在私人监控下，这种复杂性也很小。详细研究了网络路由游戏的情况。
We consider a repeated congestion game with imperfect monitoring. At each stage, each player chooses to use some facilities and pays a cost that increases with the congestion. Two versions of the model are examined: a public monitoring setting where agents observe the cost of each available facility, and a private monitoring one where players observe only the cost of the facilities they use. A partial folk theorem holds: a Pareto-optimal outcome may result from selfish behavior and be sustained by a belief-free equilibrium of the repeated game. We prove this result assuming that players use strategies of bounded complexity and we estimate the strategic complexity needed to achieve efficiency. It is shown that, under some conditions on the number of players and the structure of the game, this complexity is very small even under private monitoring. The case of network routing games is examined in detail.