Algorithm level evaluation of cryptosystem resistance to second-order DPA
Algorithm level evaluation of cryptosystem resistance to second-order DPA
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发表时间：
2007-09
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通讯作者：
Akihiko Sasaki;K. Abe
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作者：
Akihiko Sasaki;K. Abe
在之前的一项研究中，我们通过晶体管级的模拟验证了差分功率分析（DPA）中的功耗差异可以通过使用包含受攻击位的位串的汉明权重来近似。基于该验证，我们提出了一种算法级方法来评估密码系统对DPA攻击的抵抗力，并通过将其应用于数据加密标准（DES）实现的一阶DPA抗性评估来证明该方法的有效性。本文将该方法应用于二阶DPA，仿真结果与智能卡攻击实验结果一致。利用仿真方法可以定量评价DES算法对二阶DPA的抵抗能力及其对策。该方法比在RTL和下游级别使用的其他方法更快，并且可用于定量评估加密系统设计的上游级别对抗DPA的阻力。
In a previous study, we verified by simulation at the transistor level that the difference in power consumptions in Differential Power Analysis (DPA) can be approximated by using the Hamming weight of the bit string that includes an attacked bit position. Based on that verification, we proposed an algorithm-level method for evaluating the resistance of cryptosystems to DPA attacks and demonstrated the effectiveness of the method by applying it to a first-order DPA-resistance evaluation of Data Encryption Standard (DES) implementations. In this paper, we apply this method to second-order DPA and show that the simulation results are consistent with the experimental results of attacks against a smartcard. We also show that using the simulation method we can quantitatively evaluate the resistance of the DES algorithm and its countermeasures to second-order DPA. This method is faster than other methods used at the RTL and downstream levels and is useful for quantitatively evaluating the resistance of countermeasures to DPA at the upstream level of cryptosystem design.