Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
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DOI：
10.1038/nature02360
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发表时间：
2004-04-08
期刊：
影响因子：
64.8
通讯作者：
Doebeli, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hauert, C;Doebeli, M
理解合作的产生是进化生物学中的一个基本问题。进化博弈论已成为研究这一问题的有力框架。在理论和实验研究中，两个简单的博弈吸引了最多的关注：囚徒困境和雪堆博弈（也称为鹰 - 鸽博弈或胆小鬼博弈）。在囚徒困境中，非合作状态是进化稳定的，这激发了大量对能使合作行为持续的适当扩展的研究。特别是，基于囚徒困境的空间扩展，人们普遍认为空间结构促进了合作的进化。在此我们表明，对于雪堆博弈中空间结构的影响，无法做出这样的一般性预测。在无结构的雪堆博弈中，中等水平的合作持续存在。出乎意料的是，对于广泛的参数范围，空间结构降低了合作者的比例。特别是，如果合作的成本效益比很高，空间结构会消除合作。我们的结果提醒人们不要普遍认为空间结构必然对合作行为有益。
Understanding the emergence of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology(1). Evolutionary game theory(2,3) has become a powerful framework with which to investigate this problem. Two simple games have attracted most attention in theoretical and experimental studies: the Prisoner's Dilemma(4) and the snowdrift game (also known as the hawk-dove or chicken game)(5). In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the non-cooperative state is evolutionarily stable, which has inspired numerous investigations of suitable extensions that enable cooperative behaviour to persist. In particular, on the basis of spatial extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma, it is widely accepted that spatial structure promotes the evolution of cooperation(6-8). Here we show that no such general predictions can be made for the effects of spatial structure in the snowdrift game. In unstructured snowdrift games, intermediate levels of cooperation persist. Unexpectedly, spatial structure reduces the proportion of cooperators for a wide range of parameters. In particular, spatial structure eliminates cooperation if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is high. Our results caution against the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily beneficial for cooperative behaviour.