On the Economic Theory of Alliances
On the Economic Theory of Alliances
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DOI：
10.1177/002200277501900207
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发表时间：
1975-06
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
T. Sandler;Jon Cauley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Sandler;Jon Cauley
本文的目的是扩展并阐明用于联盟研究的公共物品方法。特别是，本文考察了国防作为一种纯公共物品的性质，并得出结论：由于存在可分割性和排他性特征，某些国防支出可能最好归类为非纯公共物品。为了更全面地引入资源稀缺性并展示军事联盟的共生特性，在一个更通用的框架内分析了传统的纯公共物品联盟模型。两个更具普遍性的模型重塑了分析，使得国防成为一种非纯公共物品。在非纯公共物品模型中，对最优成员规模和生产效率都进行了研究。本文最后基于俱乐部经济理论为世界和平组织提供了一个基本原理。
It is the purpose of this article to extend and to clarify the public goods approach to the study of alliances. In particular, the paper examines the nature of defense as a pure public good and draws the conclusion that some defense expenditure may be best classified as an impure public good due to the presence of divisibility and exclusion properties. The traditional pure public good model of alliances is analyzed in a more general framework in order to introduce more fully resource scarcity and to demonstrate the symbiotic properties of the military alliance. Two models of increasing generality recast the analysis so that defense is an impure public good. Both optimal membership size and production efficiency are studied in the impure public good model. The paper concludes with a rationale for world peace organizations based on the economic theory of clubs.