A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms
A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms
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发表时间：
1986-06
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通讯作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
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作者：
J. Rotemberg;Garth Saloner
本文研究面对需求波动的隐性串通寡头。未来惩罚的可信威胁提供了促进共谋的纪律。然而，作者发现，当需求高时，单方面偏离合谋结果的诱惑往往更大。为了缓和这种诱惑，优化的寡头垄断在这种时候降低其盈利能力，导致价格降低。19世纪80年代的铁路行业、50年代的汽车行业、水泥价格的周期性行为以及价格成本利润率都与这一理论相一致。寡头垄断部门降低价格可能会产生宏观后果。美国经济学会1986年版权所有。
This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuatingdemand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, the authors find that the temptation to unilaterally deviate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation, the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times, resultingin lower prices. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880s, the automobile industry in the 1950s, the cyclical behavior of cement prices, and of price-cost margins are consistent with this theory. Thereduction of price by the oligopolistic sectors may have macro consequences. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.