Optimal Auction Design with Malicious Sellers
Optimal Auction Design with Malicious Sellers
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DOI：
10.1109/percomworkshops53856.2022.9767523
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发表时间：
2022-03
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Swastik Brahma;L. Njilla;Satyaki Nan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Swastik Brahma;L. Njilla;Satyaki Nan
集成电路 (IC) 中硬件木马的存在给物联网 (IoT) 带来了严重的安全问题，而缓解此类威胁已开始引起越来越多的关注。本文通过设计一种新颖的最优拍卖机制来解决这个问题，该机制可以优化买家（系统设计者）在卖家（制造商）可以在销售的 IC 中恶意插入木马的市场中获取 IC 的效用。作为我们设计的拍卖机制的一个组成部分，本文还提出了从多个卖方冗余收购 IC 的概念，以获得买方系统运行目标的可靠性并增强其效用，并描述了买方在收购过程中应拥有的最佳冗余量。所提出的拍卖机制可以适应所获得的IC测试过程中的缺陷。还描述了在拍卖中的恶意卖家在其出售的 IC 中检测到木马后应处以的最佳罚款。给出的数值结果是为了获得对拟议拍卖机制的重要见解。
The presence of hardware Trojans in Integrated Circuits (ICs) poses a serious security concern for the Internet-of-Things (IoT) and the mitigation of such threats has started to attract growing attention. This paper addresses the problem by designing a novel optimal auction mechanism that can optimize the utility of a buyer (system designer) acquiring ICs in a market where the sellers (manufacturers) can maliciously insert Trojans in sold ICs. The paper also proposes, as an integral component of our designed auction mechanism, the concept of redundant acquisition of ICs from multiple sellers to obtain reliability in terms of the buyer’s system operation goals and enhance his utility as well as characterizes the optimal amount of redundancy the buyer should have in the acquisition process. The proposed auction mechanism can adapt to the imperfections in the process of testing acquired ICs. The optimal fine that should be imposed on a malicious seller in the auction upon detecting a Trojan in his sold IC is also characterized. Numerical results are presented to gain important insights into the proposed auction mechanism.