Judgment Aggregation
Judgment Aggregation
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发表时间:
2011
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通讯作者:
P. Mongin
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作者:
P. Mongin
Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The theory derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, which List and Pettit turned into an impossibility theorem – the first of a long list to come. After mentioning this formative stage, the paper restates what is now regarded as the “canonical theorem” of judgment aggregation theory (in three versions due to Nehring and Puppe, Dokow and Holzman, and Dietrich and Mongin, respectively). The last part of paper discusses how judgment aggregation theory connects with social choice theory and can contribute to it; it singles out two representative applications, one to Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the other to the group identification problem. 38.1 A New Brand of Aggregation Theory It is a commonplace idea that collegial institutions generally make better decisions than those in which a single individual is in charge. This optimistic view can be traced back to Enlighment theorists, such as Rousseau and Condorcet, and it permeates today’s western judiciary organization, which is heir to this philosophical tradition. The more important a legal case, the more likely it is to be entrusted to a collegial court; appeal courts are typically collegial, and at the top of the legal organization, constitutional courts always are. However, the following, by now classic example from legal theory challenges the Enlightment view. The author gratefully acknowledges Franz Dietrich’s and Ashley Piggins’s comments. P. Mongin (!) CNRS & HEC Paris, France e-mail: mongin@greg-hec.com © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 S. O. Hansson, V. F. Hendricks (eds.), Introduction to Formal Philosophy, Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_38 705