Modern Authoritarianism and Corruption
Modern Authoritarianism and Corruption
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现代威权主义与腐败
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2728822
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Y. Nisnevich
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Nisnevich
本文主要探讨现代权威主义与腐败之间的联系。尽管腐败在共产主义政权、后殖民主义政权和专制君主制中发挥着重要作用，但作为专制统治者使用的传统工具的胁迫仍然是这些政权的基础。然而，自二十世纪最后二十五年以来，出现了一种新型的非民主政权，我们称之为新独裁主义。新政权建立在高压和腐败之间的动态相互作用的基础上。这种相互作用使专制统治者能够根据该国当前的政治局势以及政治议程上的政治、经济和社会问题，将胁迫或腐败推到前台。在这类政权中，政治经济统治集团控制着国家和国家的公共权力，并利用其所有工具和资源来实现其私人目标。本文提出的实证结果表明，共产主义政权，君主制和专制君主制存在于33个现代非民主国家，而新威权主义政权可以在19个国家中找到。我表明，高水平的腐败是典型的所有这些政权，特别是在总督和新威权主义的。我解释了一个相对较低水平的腐败在专制君主制使用奥尔森的理论固定土匪。特别是，我推测，执政的君主打击官僚腐败，因为他们认为这是窃取自己的财产，损害了他们的行政租金和收入的来源。与此同时，高层政治腐败依然存在。最后，我表明，殖民地平均比经济弹性的新威权主义政权更脆弱，尽管区分它们可能具有挑战性。除了少数君主制国家，所有的威权主义和新威权主义政权都是不稳定的政权，这让我可以假设它们即将发生的转变或崩溃。
This paper focuses on the link between the modern authoritarianism and corruption. Even though corruption plays an important role in Communist regimes, post-colonial dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies, coercion - which is a traditional tool used by authoritarian rulers - remains the basis of these regimes. However, a new type of non-democratic regimes, which we call neoauthoritarian, has emerged since the last quarter of the XX century. The new regimes are based on a dynamic interplay between coercion and corruption. That interplay allows authoritarian rulers to bring to the forefront either coercion or corruption, depending on the current political situation in the country and the political, economic and social issues on the political agenda. In this type of regimes, ruling political-economic groups capture the state and the public authority in the country and use all their instruments and resources to achieve their private goals. This paper presents empirical results showing that the Communist regimes, dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies exist in 33 modern non-democratic states, while neoauthoritarian regimes can be found in 19 states. I show that high levels of corruption are typical of all of these regimes, especially in dictatorships and neoauthoritarian ones. I explain a relatively lower level of corruption in the authoritarian monarchies using Olson's theory of stationary bandit. In particular, I speculate that the ruling monarchs fight corruption among bureaucrats since they perceive it as stealing their own property that damages the sources of their administrative rent and their revenues. At the same time, the high-level political corruption persists. Finally, I show that dictatorships are on average more fragile than economically elastic neoauthoritarian regimes, although it might be challenging to differentiate between them. All authoritarian and neoauthoritarian regimes, except a few monarchies, are non-stable regimes, allowing me to hypothesize their coming transformations or collapse.