The Australian‐New Zealand agreement, 1944, and the United States
The Australian‐New Zealand agreement, 1944, and the United States
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1944 年澳大利亚-新西兰协议和美国
DOI：
10.1080/14662046608447030
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发表时间：
1966
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Reese
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Reese
1944年1月在堪培拉签署的《澳大利亚-新西兰协定》实际上是一项正式声明，表明两国对国际事务的看法有许多共同之处，如果两国共同行动，它们在盟国和世界议会中的影响力将更大。它之所以引人注目，不仅是因为这两个王国在没有英国的情况下采取行动，而且正如一位国际法学家所指出的那样，因为它们在英国和其他王国密切关注的重大政治和国际重要性问题上做出独立的决定，并且“不仅对联合国，而且对联合王国和其他王国采取正式的立场”。[1]《协定》申明在决定战后解决办法的性质方面有发言权，这反映了澳大利亚和新西兰对美国和英国政府在进行战争或准备和平方面未能与其较小的盟国充分协商的不满，特别表明了它们对日本战败后美国在太平洋的意图的怀疑。自1942年底以来，澳大利亚和新西兰政府一直为美国在太平洋盟军战役中日益占主导地位而感到不安。虽然在新加坡沦陷后的关键几周里，他们不得不把目光投向美国，但他们并不希望看到美国的影响力完全取代英国的影响力，他们仍然本能地把英国视为自己的影响力。因此，在日本的直接危险消除之后，澳大利亚和新西兰的政治考虑成为最重要的因素，它们再次求助于英联邦，作为制衡美国控制政策和行动的必要力量。例如，新西兰总理明确表示，他认为英联邦在对日进攻中作出强有力的贡献具有政治上的重要性：“这不仅是我们自己海岸和岛屿领土的直接安全问题”，他告诉弗赖贝格将军，“我们还必须从长远考虑，确保我们与英联邦其他有关部分一样，处于最有利的政治地位”。[2]然而，尽管澳大利亚和新西兰尽了最大努力，它们在盟军的反攻中只扮演了次要的积极角色。
THE Australian-New Zealand Agreement signed in Canberra in January 1944 was, in effect, a formal declaration that the views of the two countries on international affairs had much in common and that their influence in Allied and world councils would be greater if they acted together. It was striking not merely because the two Dominions acted without Britain, but because, as one international lawyer pointed out, they made independent decisions on matters of major political and international importance in which Britain and other Dominions were vitally concerned and'formally took a position vis-a-visnot only the United Nations, but vis-a-vis the United Kingdom and the other Dominions as well'. 1 In its assertion of claims to a voice in determining the character of the post-war settlement, the Agreement reflected Australian and New Zealand dissatisfaction with the failure of the American and British Governments to fully consult their smaller allies either in the conduct of the war or in the preparations for peace, and it illustrated, in particular, their suspicion of American intentions in the Pacific after the defeat of Japan. Since the end of 1942 the Australian and the New Zealand Governments had been troubled by increasing American domination of the Allied campaigns in the Pacific. Although they had been obliged to look to the United States in the critical weeks after the fall of Singapore, they had no desire to see the influence of the Americans completely supersede that of the British, which they still instinctively regarded as their own. Thus, with the immediate Japanese peril removed, political considerations came uppermost for Australia and New Zealand, which turned again to the British Commonwealth as a needed counterweight to American control of policy and operations. The New Zealand Prime Minister, for example, made clear the political importance he attached to a strong British Commonwealth contribution to the offensive against Japan:'It is not only a question of the immediate security of our own shores and our island territories', he told General Freyberg;'we must also take the long view and ensure that we, in common with other portions of the British Commonwealth concerned, are in the most favourable political position'. 2 Despite all their efforts, however, Australia and New Zealand were allotted minor active roles in the Allied counter-offensive.