Exchanging Market Access at the Outsiders' Expense: The Case of Customs Unions
Exchanging Market Access at the Outsiders' Expense: The Case of Customs Unions
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以牺牲局外人的利益来交换市场准入：关税同盟的案例
DOI：
10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00405.x
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Ornelas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Ornelas
在关税同盟下，各国可以通过协调外部关税来转移被排除在外的国家的利润，从而交换优惠的市场准入。我表明，这种协调产生的出口租金可以抵消联盟造成的贸易转移损失，即使其成员国在世界市场上相对较小。然而，这些收益是以被排除在外的国家为代价的。我指出，小国也可以利用关税同盟促进多边合作，办法是增加被排除在外的国家支持全球自由贸易的激励措施。
Under a customs union, countries can exchange preferential market access by coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries. I show that the exporting rents resulting from this coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union, even if its members are relatively small in world markets. Such gains come, however, at the expense of excluded countries. I show that small countries can use customs unions also to foster multilateral cooperation, by increasing the incentives of excluded countries to support global free trade.