Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses
Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses
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通过单个许可的价格上限筛选良好的专利池
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20140237
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Aleksandra Boutin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aleksandra Boutin
专利池在向技术出售补充投入时会降低价格，但在涉及替代品时也可以有效地卡特尔市场。通过重新引入竞争，独立许可确保只有当涉及两个专利持有者时才会形成良好的池。对于较大的池，独立许可需要得到其他政策工具的补充。我们建议限制在专利池之外单独授权的专利的使用费，并设置价格上限，以复制专利池的共享规则。这种无信息的筛选设备适用于不对称，即使许可方试图通过以可能不反映贡献的方式重新调整共享规则来稳定池。
Patent pools reduce prices when selling complementary inputs to technologies, but can also effectively cartelize markets when involving substitutes. Independent licensing, by reintroducing competition, ensures that only good pools form when there are two patent holders involved. For larger pools, independent licensing needs to be complemented by other policy tools. We propose to constrain the royalties for the patents individually licensed outside the pool with price caps replicating the pool's sharing rule. This information-free screening device works with asymmetries, even when licensors try to stabilize pools by readjusting the sharing rule in a way that may not reflect contributions.