Seniority and Support for Government Spending in the U.S. House: Is There a Culture of Spending?
Seniority and Support for Government Spending in the U.S. House: Is There a Culture of Spending?
复制标题
美国众议院对政府支出的资历和支持：是否存在支出文化？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
James C. Garand
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rebekah Myers;James C. Garand
Payne（1991 a）假设美国国会存在一种“支出文化”，国会议员接触的信息来源主要是支持支出的信息。佩恩认为，其结果是，议员们被社会化为支持支出的态度和行为，特别是在他们在国会工作了一段时间之后。因此，佩恩假设，资历和支持支出的点名行为之间存在密切关系。在本文中，我们开发和测试一个基于资历的模型，唱名表决的支出事项。使用美国众议院议员从第97届到第107届国会的数据，我们估计了一系列模型，在这些模型中，我们将全国纳税人联盟（NTU）的分数描述为资历，政党和一系列选区变量的函数。我们发现一个一致的和强大的资历效应，与资深成员更有可能支持更多的支出比他们的初级同事。此外，我们发现，即使在我们考虑到保守的众议院议员更倾向于离开会议厅，因此未能达到高级别的资历之后，这种关系仍然完好无损。
Payne (1991a) postulates that there is a “culture of spending” in the U.S. Congress, whereby the sources of information to which members of Congress are exposed are dominated by pro-spending messages. The result, suggests Payne, is that members are socialized into pro-spending attitudes and behavior, particularly after they have been in Congress for some time. Payne hence posits a strong relationship between seniority and pro-spending roll-call behavior. In this paper we develop and test a seniority-based model of roll-call voting on spending matters. Using data for U.S. House members from the 97th to the 107th congresses, we estimate a series of models in which we depict National Taxpayer Union (NTU) scores as a function of seniority, party, and a range of constituency variables. We find a consistent and strong seniority effect, with senior members more likely to support greater spending than their junior colleagues. Further, we find that this relationship remains intact even after we account for the greater propensity of conservative House members to depart the chamber and hence fail to achieve high levels of seniority.