Data-plane Defenses against Routing Attacks on Tor
Data-plane Defenses against Routing Attacks on Tor
复制标题
针对 Tor 路由攻击的数据平面防御
DOI：
10.1515/popets-2016-0040
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wenchao Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Henry Tan;M. Sherr;Wenchao Zhou
摘要ToR容易受到流量关联攻击，在这种攻击中，观察到进出匿名网络的流的攻击者可以应用统计技术来关联流并解除其端点的匿名化。虽然敌手可能不是天生就处于进行此类攻击的位置，但最近的一项研究表明，可以操纵互联网的控制平面来增加对手对网络的看法，从而提高其执行流量关联的能力。本文深入研究了控制平面攻击对ToR网络安全的影响。使用实时ToR网络的准确模型，我们通过测量Tor网络中易受攻击的部分以及执行攻击的对手的优势来量化Tor对这些攻击的敏感度。我们进一步提出了保护Tor用户免受控制平面操纵的防御机制。也许令人惊讶的是，我们表明，通过利用ToR中的现有信任锚，仅在数据平面部署的防御就足以检测大多数控制平面攻击。我们的防御不假定互联网服务提供商的积极参与，并且只需要对ToR进行非常小的改变。我们表明，我们的防御导致某些控制面攻击的有效性降低了十倍以上。
Abstract Tor is susceptible to traffic correlation attacks in which an adversary who observes flows entering and leaving the anonymity network can apply statistical techniques to correlate flows and de-anonymize their endpoints. While an adversary may not be naturally positioned to conduct such attacks, a recent study shows that the Internet’s control-plane can be manipulated to increase an adversary’s view of the network, and consequently, improve its ability to perform traffic correlation. This paper explores, in-depth, the effects of control-plane attacks on the security of the Tor network. Using accurate models of the live Tor network, we quantify Tor’s susceptibility to these attacks by measuring the fraction of the Tor network that is vulnerable and the advantage to the adversary of performing the attacks. We further propose defense mechanisms that protect Tor users from manipulations at the control-plane. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that by leveraging existing trust anchors in Tor, defenses deployed only in the data-plane are sufficient to detect most control-plane attacks. Our defenses do not assume the active participation of Internet Service Providers, and require only very small changes to Tor. We show that our defenses result in a more than tenfold decrease in the effectiveness of certain control-plane attacks.