Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon
Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon
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DOI：
10.1016/j.concog.2019.102779
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发表时间：
2019-09-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Railo, Henry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jylkka, Jussi;Railo, Henry
研究意识的典型经验方法认为，我们只能观察经验的神经关联，而不能观察经验本身。相比之下，在本文中，我们认为体验是具体的物理现象，可以与其他现象（包括观察者）发生因果相互作用。因此，可以观察经验并对其进行科学建模。我们认为，经验与其神经机制的科学模型之间的认知差距源于这样一个事实：该模型仅仅是基于观察的理论构造，与它所模拟的具体现象（即经验本身）不同。从这个意义上说，任何自然现象与其科学模型之间都存在差距。按照这种方法，体验的构成机制的神经科学理论实际上是主观体验本身的模型。我们认为，这种元理论框架为意识的实证研究提供了坚实的基础。
The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.