Public Disclosure and Bank Failures
Public Disclosure and Bank Failures
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公开披露和银行倒闭
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Eduardo Levy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Cordella;Eduardo Levy
本文分析了公开披露银行风险敞口对银行风险承担激励的影响及其对银行体系稳健的影响。我们发现，当银行完全控制其贷款组合的波动性时，公开披露降低了发生银行危机的可能性。然而，当资产风险主要由银行经理无法控制的外部因素驱动时，信息披露可能会增加银行业的脆弱性，因为更安全的资产选择的潜在收益被资产风险与知情储户要求的存款利率之间的正相关产生的负反馈所抵消。
This paper analyses the impact of public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure on banks’ risk taking incentives and its implications in terms of soundness of the banking system. We find that, when banks have a complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crises. When asset risk is driven largely by exogenous factors beyond the control of bank managers, however, information disclosure may increase banking sector fragility, as the potential gains from a safer choice of assets is offset by the negative feed-back, arising from a positive correlation between asset risk and the deposit rate demanded by informed depositors.