Economics of Overlay Networks: An Industrial Organization Perspective on Network Economics
Economics of Overlay Networks: An Industrial Organization Perspective on Network Economics
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覆盖网络经济学：网络经济学的产业组织视角
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Faratin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Faratin
本文运用产业组织理论论证了互联网覆盖网络的进入和扩展激励的需求和成本条件，并将问题限制在互联网内容分发上。我们描述了批发和零售市场的市场结构，需求的性质和成本分配机制。我们展示了如何端到端的互联网服务提供商和内容提供商的协调失败，导致批发市场的失败，诱导进入适当的内容分发“中间盒”，作为中介，协调未满足的需求。我们还表明，中介机构有动机战略性地利用互联网成本分配机制，利用这些间接的外部性贸易的内部化和规模。这种覆盖市场的扩展激励也简要地比较了P2P内容网络实施的讨价还价机构。
We use theory of Industrial Organization to demonstrate the demand and cost conditions on entry and scaling incentives of Internet overlay networks, restricting the problem to Internet content distribution. We describe the market structure, the nature of demand and the cost-allocation mechanism in both wholesale and retail markets. We show how the end-to-end coordination failures of the ISPs and content providers has resulted in wholesale market failures, inducing entry by propriety content distribution “middleboxes” that act as intermediaries, coordinating unmet demands. We also show that the intermediary has incentives to strategically use the Internet costallocation mechanism to internalize and scale using these indirect externalities from trade. The scaling incentives of such overlay markets is also briefly compared with bargaining institutions implemented by P2P content networks.