Constrained Signaling in Auction Design
Constrained Signaling in Auction Design
复制标题
拍卖设计中的约束信号
DOI：
10.1137/1.9781611973402.99
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Aaron Roth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Dughmi;Nicole Immorlica;Aaron Roth
我们认为，当拍卖师没有能力向买家描述他所拥有的商品的确切身份时出售。取而代之的是，他必须提出一个约束的信号计划：（非注射式）映射从货物到信号，这满足了其设置的限制。例如，拍卖师可能只能为每种商品传达一个有界的长度消息，或者他可能会在他如何宣传所出售商品方面受到法律限制。每种候选信号方案都会引起买家之间不完整的信息游戏，而拍卖师的目标是选择信号方案并随附优化福利的拍卖格式。在本文中，我们使用来自次体函数最大化和无重组学习的技术为计算各种受约束信号问题的计算受约束信号方案的算法。
We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that he is selling. Instead, he must come up with a constrained signalling scheme: a (non injective) mapping from goods to signals, that satisfies the constraints of his setting. For example, the auctioneer may be able to communicate only a bounded length message for each good, or he might be legally constrained in how he can advertise the item being sold. Each candidate signaling scheme induces an incomplete-information game among the buyers, and the goal of the auctioneer is to choose the signaling scheme and accompanying auction format that optimizes welfare. In this paper, we use techniques from submodular function maximization and no-regret learning to give algorithms for computing constrained signaling schemes for a variety of constrained signaling problems.