Public rationing and private cost incentives
Public rationing and private cost incentives
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公共配给和私人成本激励
DOI：
10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00163-9
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
C. Ma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Ma
本文研究了在一个由公共和私人供应商共同服务的市场中，公共供应商对配给的战略性使用。这种混合的市场结构在医疗保健、电信、邮政和公用事业等许多行业都很常见。私营部门的技术表现出越来越大的回报：每个公司都可以以固定成本的形式付出“努力”，以降低边际成本。在可竞争的私营部门中，企业进行竞争，市场均衡的特征是平均成本定价。均衡的私营部门市场规模太低，导致成本努力不足。有效的配给迫使更多的消费者使用私营部门，恢复成本激励并实施最好的做法。随机配给可能会降低成本低效率，但不能实现第一个最好的效果。
This paper considers a public provider’s strategic use of rationing in a market served by both public and private providers. Such a ‘mixed’ market structure is common in many industries such as health care, telecommunication, postal service, and public utilities. The technology in the private sector exhibits increasing returns: each firm can expend ‘effort’ in the form of fixed cost to reduce the marginal cost. Firms in the contestable private sector compete and the market equilibrium is characterized by average-cost pricing. The equilibrium private sector market size is too low, resulting in deficient cost effort. Efficient rationing forces more consumers to use the private sector, restoring cost incentives and implementing the first best. Random rationing may reduce cost inefficiency but does not implement the first best.