Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints
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彩票、太阳黑子和激励约束
DOI:
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发表时间:
2002
期刊:
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通讯作者:
E. Prescott
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
T. Kehoe;D. Levine;E. Prescott
We study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in consumer economy, which is a standard convex, finite consumer, finite good, pure exchange economy. With decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities, we prove that no lotteries are actually used in equilibrium. We provide a simple numerical example with increasing absolute risk aversion in which lotteries are necessarily used in equilibrium. We also show how the equilibrium allocation in this example can be implemented in a sunspot equilibrium.