Urban Driving Games With Lexicographic Preferences and Socially Efficient Nash Equilibria
Urban Driving Games With Lexicographic Preferences and Socially Efficient Nash Equilibria
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具有词典偏好和社会效率纳什均衡的城市驾驶游戏
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
5.2
通讯作者：
E. Frazzoli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Zanardi;Enrico Mion;M. Bruschetta;S. Bolognani;A. Censi;E. Frazzoli
我们将城市驾驶游戏（Urban Driving Games, udg）描述为一类特殊的差分游戏，它模拟了城市驾驶任务的相互作用和激励。司机们拥有“共同”的利益，比如不互相碰撞，但在遵守交通规则和实现个人目标方面也有自我利益。受制于它们的物理动态，代理的偏好是通过词典关系来表达的，词典关系将不碰撞的共同目标作为第一优先级。在温和的假设下，我们表明公共udg具有字典顺序潜在游戏的结构，这使我们能够证明几个有趣的属性。也就是说，社会有效均衡可以通过解决单个（字典）最优控制问题来找到，迭代的最佳响应方案具有理想的收敛保证。
We describe Urban Driving Games (UDGs) as a particular class of differential games that model the interactions and incentives of the urban driving task. The drivers possess a “communal” interest, such as not colliding with each other, but are also self-interested in fulfilling traffic rules and personal objectives. Subject to their physical dynamics, the preference of the agents is expressed via a lexicographic relation that puts as first priority the shared objective of not colliding. Under mild assumptions, we show that communal UDGs have the structure of a lexicographic ordinal potential game which allows us to prove several interesting properties. Namely, socially efficient equilibria can be found by solving a single (lexicographic) optimal control problem and iterated best response schemes have desirable convergence guarantees.
DOI：
10.15607/rss.2020.xvi.091
发表时间：
2019-10
期刊：
ArXiv
影响因子：
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作者：
Simon Le Cleac'h;M. Schwager;Zachary Manchester
通讯作者：
Simon Le Cleac'h;M. Schwager;Zachary Manchester