MPC with Friends and Foes
MPC with Friends and Foes
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MPC 与朋友和敌人
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anat Paskin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barash Alon;Eran Omri;Anat Paskin
安全多方计算的经典定义假设存在一个单一的对抗实体控制的腐败方的集合。直观地说，该定义要求在现实世界的执行中，对手的观点，腐败的t方，可以由理想模型中的对手模拟，其中各方仅通过受信任方进行交互。然而，在协议中没有对诚实方的观点施加任何限制，因此，如果诚实方获得关于其他诚实方的私人输入的信息，则不被视为侵犯隐私。这在许多属于MPC框架的情况下是不可取的。然而，存在安全协议（例如，Ishai等人的2轮多方协议[IPPTO 2010]容忍单个被破坏方），其指示诚实方向所有其他诚实方揭示其私有输入（一旦以某种方式识别出恶意方）。
Classical definitions for secure multiparty computation assume the existence of a single adversarial entity controlling the set of corrupted parties. Intuitively, the definition requires that the view of the adversary, corrupting t parties, in a real-world execution can be simulated by an adversary in an ideal model, where parties interact only via a trusted-party. No restrictions, however, are imposed on the view of honest parties in the protocol, thus, if honest parties obtain information about the private inputs of other honest parties – it is not counted as a violation of privacy. This is arguably undesirable in many situations that fall into the MPC framework. Nevertheless, there are secure protocols (e.g., the 2-round multiparty protocol of Ishai et al. [CRYPTO 2010] tolerating a single corrupted party) that instruct the honest parties to reveal their private inputs to all other honest parties (once the malicious party is somehow identified).