Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist
Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist
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宪法契约中的自由：政治经济学家的视角
DOI：
10.2307/2231886
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发表时间：
1979
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Buchanan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Buchanan
把布坎南教授称为我们这个时代的原始思想家之一几乎是老生常谈，但是他的推理的清晰和温和常常让我们把通过深思熟虑的推理得出的常识和常识，以及以前很少有人知道的常识和常识。在这本关于社会组织基本问题的现有著作的扩充集中，布坎南面临着描述社区生活的规则和协议必须存在的条件的必要性;他采取了现有的或已经提出的替代安排，并轮换它们，并审查其模式中的一致性或缺陷的每一个方面;他得出的结论是明确的假设或具体的建议。它是有序的思维和良好的写作，无论是作为一个集合和在每一篇文章。但布坎南的工作也充满激情。激情和信念-作为一个人道主义者，他相信个人可以获得最大的幸福，作为一个个人主义者，他相信人们可以独自定义幸福所带来的东西，布坎南寻求一种可以实现的社会宪法，以建立一个人被承认为他的同胞的社会。这就是这个系列，以及布坎南的所有作品。全书分为五个部分。在《无政府状态、法律和看不见的手》中，似乎没有希望建立一个普遍理想的宪政社会的结构被消除了。《社会契约的结构》一书阐述了宪政社会的契约主义方法。在《执行困境》一书中，我们面临着执行所选择的规则这一不可避免的问题。最后两部分提供了一些“契约主义-宪政主义逻辑的经济应用”，以及对美国当前形势的考察，以及布坎南自己对改革和摆脱“宪政无政府状态”的处方。什么是宪政主义者-契约主义者？一个至关重要的原则支撑并证明了这个扩张术语的使用：一个宪政主义者承认
It is almost trite to call Professor Buchanan one of the original thinkers of our time, but the clarity and gentleness of his reasoning too often lets us take for common sense and common knowledge that which came through deliberate reasoning and was previously known by few. In this augmented collection of some of his existing work on the fundamental problems of social organizations, Buchanan faces the necessity of describing the conditions under which rules and agreements for community life must exist; he takes the alternative arrangements which exist or have been proposed and rotates them and examines each facet for coherence or flaw in their pattern; and he draws conclusions which are clear hypotheses or specific recommendations. It is orderly thinking and good writing, both as a collection and within each essay. But there is also passion in Buchanan's work. Passion and belief an example of that thin-spread ability to take a stand do not mar the analysis: the belief is clearly set forth, and the passion reserved for those who will analyze without recognizable description of the problem or conclude without analysis. As a humanist, believing in the greatest attainable happiness for individual human beings, and as an individualist believing that people can define for themselves alone what happiness entails, Buchanan seeks a plausibly attainable social constitution for a society of person's recognizable as his fellow human beings. That is what this collection, and all Buchanan's work, is about. The book is divided into five parts. In 'Anarchy, Law, and the Invisible Hand' structures are eliminated which seem to offer no hope of a generally desirable constitutional society. The contractarian approach to a constitutional society is set forth in 'The Structure of Social Contract'. The inevitable problem of enforcing chosen rules is faced in 'The Enforcement Dilemma. And the concluding two sections offer some 'Economic Applications of the contractarian-constitutionalist logic, and an examination of the current situation in the United States together with Buchanan's own prescriptions for reform and for escape from 'constitutional anarchy'. What is a constitutionalist-contractarian? One crucial principle underlies and justifies the use of this distended term: a constitutionalist recognizes