Bayesian group belief
Bayesian group belief
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贝叶斯群体信念
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
F. Dietrich
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Dietrich
如果一个群体被建模为一个单一的贝叶斯代理，它的信念应该是什么？我提出了一个公理化的模型，连接组的信念，信仰的组成员。群体成员可能有不同的信息，不同的先验信念，甚至不同的领域（代数），他们持有的信念，占意识和概念化的差异。如图所示，群体信念可以整合传播在个人之间的所有信息，而无需个人明确传达他们的信息（这些信息可能过于复杂或个人化而无法描述，或者原则上无法用语言描述）。如果人们的信息是独立的，这里得出的群体信念采取简单的乘法形式（如果信息任意重叠，则采取更复杂的形式）。这种形式与熟悉的线性或几何意见汇集以及尊重一致信念的（帕累托）要求形成鲜明对比。
If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of the group members. The group members may have different information, different prior beliefs and even different domains (algebras) within which they hold beliefs, accounting for differences in awareness and conceptualisation. As is shown, group beliefs can incorporate all information spread across individuals without individuals having to explicitly communicate their information (that may be too complex or personal to describe, or not describable in principle in the language). The group beliefs derived here take a simple multiplicative form if people’s information is independent (and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily). This form contrasts with familiar linear or geometric opinion pooling and the (Pareto) requirement of respecting unanimous beliefs.