Technology investments into a supplier with upstream entry

Technology investments into a supplier with upstream entry
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DOI:
10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.054
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发表时间:
2022-06
期刊:
Eur. J. Oper. Res.
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Guanmei Liu;Haijun Wang;X. Shao
Guanmei Liu;Haijun Wang;X. Shao
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Guanmei Liu;Haijun Wang;X. Shao

文献摘要

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本研究探讨供应链上游进入的影响,其中一个制造商(她),面对一个潜在的供应商进入,使技术投资到在位供应商(他)或进入供应商。我们首先发现,上游进入可能会激励制造商进行更多的投资到现任者,除非进入者有生产成本优势,现任者,鉴于高投资成本。我们的工作进一步揭示了“三赢”的结果可能是所有参与者都可以实现的,因为不仅是制造商,而且令人惊讶的是,无论她投资于哪个供应商,在上游进入后,现任者都可以获得更高的利润。此外,在进入者在场的情况下,提供了技术投资方的制造商选择策略。在现有者的生产成本较低的情况下,如果两个供应商的生产成本比很大,而两者的投资成本相差很小,或者如果两个供应商的生产成本比很大,而两者的投资成本相差很小,而现有者的投资成本很小,则制造商应该投资于进入者;否则,制造商应该投资于现有者。如果在位者的生产成本较高,那么,如果在位者的生产成本比为中(大),而在位者的投资成本与进入者的投资成本相差不大,那么制造商应该投资于进入者;否则,制造商应该投资于在位者。最后,一个扩展,制造商投资到两个供应商,进行了讨论。
This study examines the effect of the upstream entry in a supply chain, where one manufacturer (she), facing the entry of one potential supplier, makes technology investments into the incumbent supplier (he) or the entrant supplier. We first find the upstream entry may motivate the manufacturer to make more investments into the incumbent, unless the entrant has a production cost advantage over the incumbent, given a high investment cost. Our work further reveals a ‘triple win’ outcome may be achievable for all players, as not only the manufacturer but surprisingly the incumbent can receive higher profits after the upstream entry, no matter which supplier she invests in. Moreover, the manufacturer’s optional strategies of technology investee are offered in the presence of the entrant. Given a low production cost of the incumbent, the manufacturer should invest in the entrant, if the production cost ratio between the two suppliers is large and the investment cost difference between them is small, or if the ratio is very large, and the difference is small while the incumbent’s investment cost is small; and she should invest in the incumbent otherwise. Given a high production cost of the incumbent, the manufacturer should invest in the entrant, if the production cost ratio is medium (large), and meanwhile the incumbent’s investment cost, holding a small difference with the entrant’s, is large (small); and she should invest in the incumbent otherwise. Finally, one extension, where the manufacturer invests into both suppliers, is discussed.