Democratization and State capacity
Democratization and State capacity
复制标题
民主化和国家能力
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anastassia V. Obydenkova
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Schmitter;Claudius Wagemann;Anastassia V. Obydenkova
当一个政体从某种形式的专制“转变”为……其他形式时，其国家机器的能力会发生什么变化？而且，如果其他东西成为某种形式的民主，那么这个独特的、或多或少集中的机构垄断了对特定领土和人口合法使用集体暴力的权利（参见马克斯·韦伯），它在物质资源、主体服从、强制手段和/或象征性存在方面是否会获得或损失？正如许多自由主义者所声称的那样，民主本质上是对国家怀有敌意的吗？或者，它是否为实施集体决策提供了更可靠的基础，正如许多社会主义者和社会民主党人所认为的那样？
When a polity “transits” from some form of autocracy to ... something else, what happens to the capacity of its state apparatus? And, if that something else becomes some form of democracy, does that distinctive, more-or-less centralized institution with a monopoly over the legitimate use of collective violence for a specific territory and population (cf. Max Weber) gain or lose in material resources, subject compliance, coercive means and/or symbolic presence? Is democracy intrinsically hostile to the state, as many liberals claim? Or, does it provide a more reliable base for the implementation of collective decisions, as many socialists and social democrats believe?