Firm Age and the Evolution of Borrowing Costs: Evidence from Japanese Small Firms
Firm Age and the Evolution of Borrowing Costs: Evidence from Japanese Small Firms
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.01.001
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发表时间：
2010-08
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Koji Sakai;Iichiro Uesugi;Tsutomu Watanabe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Koji Sakai;Iichiro Uesugi;Tsutomu Watanabe
本文研究了企业的借贷成本如何随着年龄的增长而变化。使用1997-2002年约10万家依赖银行的小企业的新面板数据集，并侧重于“适应”渠道（即，幸存企业的借贷成本随着它们的老化而下降）和“选择”的成本（即，总借贷成本随着违约企业的退出而下降），我们发现Diamond（1989）提出的声誉假说比企业动态（Cooley and Quadrini，2001）或关系银行（靴子and Thakor，1994）假说更合理地解释了借贷成本的年龄曲线。此外，我们还研究了日本的企业选择过程是自然的还是不自然的。我们的研究结果表明，质量差的企业被分离，面临更高的借贷成本，最终被迫退出，这是很自然的，这与Peek and Rosengren（2005）等以往关于日本信贷分配的研究结果形成了鲜明对比。此外，我们发现，借贷成本的演变部分是由于选择，但主要是由于适应。
This paper investigates how firms’ borrowing costs evolve as they age. Using a new panel data set of about 100,000 bank-dependent small firms for 1997–2002 and focusing on the channel of “adaptation” (i.e., surviving firms’ borrowing costs decline as they age) and that of “selection” (i.e., total borrowing costs decline as defaulting firms exit), we find that the reputation hypothesis suggested by Diamond (1989) provides a more plausible explanation of the downward sloping age profile of borrowing costs than the firm dynamics (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001) or the relationship banking (Boot and Thakor, 1994) hypothesis. In addition, we examine whether the firm selection process in Japan has been natural or unnatural. Our findings suggest that it has been natural in that firms with lower quality are separated, face higher borrowing costs, and are eventually forced to exit, which contrasts with the results of previous studies on credit allocations in Japan, including Peek and Rosengren (2005). Further, we find that the evolution of borrowing costs is partially due to selection but is mainly attributable to adaptation.