A Novel Side-Channel in Real-Time Schedulers
A Novel Side-Channel in Real-Time Schedulers
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DOI：
10.1109/rtas.2019.00016
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发表时间：
2018-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chien-Ying Chen;Sibin Mohan;R. Pellizzoni;R. Bobba;N. Kiyavash
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作者：
Chien-Ying Chen;Sibin Mohan;R. Pellizzoni;R. Bobba;N. Kiyavash
我们证明了在抢占式、固定优先级实时系统（RTS）中存在一种新的调度器侧信道；此类系统的示例可在汽车系统、航空电子系统、发电厂和工业控制系统等中找到。这种侧信道可能泄露重要的定时信息，例如实时任务未来的到达时间。然后，这些信息可被用于发起毁灭性攻击，这里（在真实硬件平台上）展示了其中两种攻击。需要注意的是，由于调度中的运行时变化、系统中存在多个其他任务以及RTS设计中的典型约束（例如期限），获取这种定时信息并不容易。我们的ScheduLeak算法展示了如何有效地利用这种侧信道。在真实操作系统（实时Linux和FreeRTOS）上给出了一个完整的实现。ScheduLeak泄露的定时信息可以极大地帮助其他更高级的攻击更好地实现其目标。
We demonstrate the presence of a novel scheduler side-channel in preemptive, fixed-priority real-time systems (RTS); examples of such systems can be found in automotive systems, avionic systems, power plants and industrial control systems among others. This side-channel can leak important timing information such as the future arrival times of real-time tasks. This information can then be used to launch devastating attacks, two of which are demonstrated here (on real hardware platforms). Note that it is not easy to capture this timing information due to runtime variations in the schedules, the presence of multiple other tasks in the system and the typical constraints (e.g., deadlines) in the design of RTS. Our ScheduLeak algorithms demonstrate how to effectively exploit this side-channel. A complete implementation is presented on real operating systems (in Real-time Linux and FreeRTOS). Timing information leaked by ScheduLeak can significantly aid other, more advanced, attacks in better accomplishing their goals.