Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks
Cyclic locking and memristor-based obfuscation against CycSAT and inside foundry attacks
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DOI：
10.23919/date.2018.8341984
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发表时间：
2018-04
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通讯作者：
Amin Rezaei;Yuanqi Shen;Shuyu Kong;Jie Gu;H. Zhou
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文献类型：
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作者：
Amin Rezaei;Yuanqi Shen;Shuyu Kong;Jie Gu;H. Zhou
IC设计的高成本使CHIP保护成为半导体行业的首要任务之一。尽管有一个普遍的印象是组合电路必须在没有任何循环的情况下设计，但带有循环的电路也可以是组合的。这样的循环电路可用于可靠锁定IC。此外，由于Memristor与CMOS结构兼容，因此可以使用多态Memristor-CMOS门有效地混淆循环回路。在这种情况下，具有不同功能的电路的布局看起来完全相同，即使是内部铸造攻击者，也无法通过查看IC的布局来区分IC的定义功能。在本文中，我们提出了一种基于循环锁定和多态性概念cmos混淆的综合芯片保护方法。证明了针对最先进的主要固定攻击的鲁棒性，并研究了多态性大门的开销。
The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. Although there is a common impression that combinational circuits must be designed without any cycles, circuits with cycles can be combinational as well. Such cyclic circuits can be used to reliably lock ICs. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently obfuscate cyclic circuits using polymorphic memristor-CMOS gates. In this case, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive chip protection method based on cyclic locking and polymorphic memristor-CMOS obfuscation. The robustness against state-of-the-art key-pruning attacks is demonstrated and the overhead of the polymorphic gates is investigated.