Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey
Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey
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DOI：
10.1007/s10683-020-09667-7
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发表时间：
2020-07-17
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Kuebler, Dorothea
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hakimov, Rustamdjan;Kuebler, Dorothea
本文调查了集中匹配市场的实验文献，包括学校选择和大学录取模型。在学校选择模型中，市场的一方（学校）不是战略性的，规则（优先级）指导录取决定。该模式涵盖了诸如择校计划、许多国家的集中式大学招生以及教师到学校的集中分配等应用。在大学招生模式中，市场的双方都是战略性的。它适用于大学可以选择学生的国家的学院和大学招生，以及集中的劳动力市场，如将医生分配到医院。该调查讨论了各种集中机制的比较、参与者策略的最佳性、申请者的学习及其行为偏差，以及沟通、信息和建议的作用等。在调查中考虑的主要实验结果关注的真理告诉和策略操纵的代理，以及匹配结果的稳定性和效率。
The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications such as school choice programs, centralized university admissions in many countries, and the centralized assignment of teachers to schools. In the college admissions model, both sides of the market are strategic. It applies to college and university admissions in countries where universities can select students, and centralized labor markets such as the assignment of doctors to hospitals. The survey discusses, among other things, the comparison of various centralized mechanisms, the optimality of participants' strategies, learning by applicants and their behavioral biases, as well as the role of communication, information, and advice. The main experimental findings considered in the survey concern truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, as well as the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome.