Successes and failures in coordinating expectations
Successes and failures in coordinating expectations
复制标题
协调期望的成功和失败
DOI:
10.1016/0014-2921(93)90015-3
复制
发表时间:
1993
影响因子:
2.8
通讯作者:
R. Guesnerie
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Guesnerie
Decisions of rational agents depend on their perception of present conditions but also on their assessment of the conditions they will face in the future-conditions on which they form (so-called) expectations. Expectations indeed play a crucial role not only in formal models of economic analysis but also in the unformal discussion of economic issues. In formal economic modelling, the dominant assumption nowadays, the Rational Expectations Hypothesis(from now on REH), assumes that economic decisions units-households, firms-have coordinated expectations. Precisely, the REH assumes:(i) that all economic decision units refer to the same image of the future (something that could be called ‘weak’coordination). Since such a common reference may be stochastic, it is compatible with different probability assessments of future conditions, as soon as such differences reflect differences in information.(ii) that the common image of the future is the true image (something that could be called ‘true’coordination). Again, the truth that is alluded to is statistical truth: expectations are statistically right-unbiased in technical terms.‘True’coordination, or I will use as synonyms‘full’coordination or ‘strong’coordination, is the distinctive feature of the REH’A critical assessment of such a full coordination assumption-and this is the purpose of this lecture-will necessarily bring us back to the intellectual debate that