Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization
Differentially private and strategy-proof spectrum auction with approximate revenue maximization
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/infocom.2015.7218463
复制
发表时间：
2015-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ruihao Zhu;K. Shin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ruihao Zhu;K. Shin
无线移动的用户和应用的快速增长导致了对频谱的高需求。拍卖是提高频谱资源利用率的有力工具，目前已经提出了许多拍卖机制。然而，没有一个人同时考虑了投标人的隐私和拍卖人的收益。在本文中，我们研究了隐私保护拍卖机制的设计。首先，我们提出了一个差分私人拍卖机制，可以实现防策略和一个接近最优的预期收益的虚拟估价的概念的基础上。假设投标人的估价分布的知识，近最优的差分私人和防策略拍卖机制使用广义Vickrey-Clarke-格罗夫斯拍卖支付方案，以实现高收益的高概率。为了解决其高计算复杂度，我们还提出了一个近似的差分PrivAte，策略证明，多项式易处理的频谱（PASS）拍卖机制，可以实现次优的收入。PASS使用单调分配算法和临界支付方案来实现防策略性。我们还通过模拟广泛评估PASS，表明它可以产生更多的收入比现有的机制在频谱拍卖市场。
The rapid growth of wireless mobile users and applications has led to high demand of spectrum. Auction is a powerful tool to improve the utilization of spectrum resource, and many auction mechanisms have been proposed thus far. However, none of them has considered both the privacy of bidders and the revenue gain of the auctioneer together. In this paper, we study the design of privacy-preserving auction mechanisms. We first propose a differentially private auction mechanism which can achieve strategy-proofness and a near optimal expected revenue based on the concept of virtual valuation. Assuming the knowledge of the bidders' valuation distributions, the near optimal differentially private and strategy-proof auction mechanism uses the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction payment scheme to achieve high revenue with a high probability. To tackle its high computational complexity, we also propose an approximate differentially PrivAte, Strategy-proof, and polynomially tractable Spectrum (PASS) auction mechanism that can achieve a suboptimal revenue. PASS uses a monotone allocation algorithm and the critical payment scheme to achieve strategy-proofness. We also evaluate PASS extensively via simulation, showing that it can generate more revenue than existing mechanisms in the spectrum auction markets.