Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation
Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation
复制标题
网络形成的订阅机制
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2920
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Eyal Winter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Suresh Mutuswami;Eyal Winter
我们分析了一个网络形成的模型，其中形成链接的成本是众所周知的，但个人的利益是不知道的社会规划。我们的目标是设计一种机制，不仅确保一个有效的网络总是形成平衡，但也确保由此产生的净收益的代理人是公平的。为此，我们提出了两种机制，在第一，代理商宣布顺序的球员，他们希望形成链接和成本贡献。我们发现，这个游戏的所有子博弈完美均衡的结果形成一个有效的网络，但由此产生的净收益是不对称的。第二种机制通过第一种机制的两级变体来纠正这种不对称性。我们还讨论了基本模型的扩展，以涵盖有向图的情况，并给出了所提出的机制不受联盟偏差影响的条件。
We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of forming links are publicly known but an individual's benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a mechanism which not only ensures that an efficient network always forms in equilibrium but also ensures that the resulting net payoffs to the agents are equitable. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; in the first, agents announce sequentially the set of players with whom they wish to form links and a cost contribution. We show that all subgame perfect equilibria of this game result in the formation of an efficient network but the resulting net payoffs are asymmetric. The second mechanism corrects this asymmetry through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. We also discuss an extension of the basic model to cover the case of directed graphs and give conditions under which the proposed mechanisms are immune to deviations by coalitions.