Asymmetric Oligopoly and Technology Transfers
Asymmetric Oligopoly and Technology Transfers
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不对称寡头垄断和技术转让
DOI：
10.2307/2234782
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. ManfrediM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
La Manna;A. ManfrediM
利用一个简单的古诺模型，本文证明了：(1)如果技术是完全可复制的，那么低成本企业总是有转移其技术的动机，因此，完全不对称的寡头垄断永远不可能是非合作的纳什均衡；(2)由于任何两个企业之间的技术转移总是可以被其他企业扰乱，在纯策略下，古诺博弈和技术转移不存在非合作的纳什均衡；(3)存在非线性转移支付，即使在有限重复博弈中，也存在维持完全合谋结果的非合作的纳什均衡。版权所有：皇家经济学会，版权1993年。
Using a simple Cournot model, this paper shows that (1) if technologies are perfectly replicable, then a lower-cost firm has always an incentive to transfer its technology and, as a result, a fully asymmetric oligopoly can never be a noncooperative Nash equilibrium; (2) as a technology transfer between any two firms can always be disrupted by some other firm, the Cournot game cum technology transfer has no noncooperative Nash equilibria in pure strategies; and (3) there exi st nonlinear transfer payments that sustain the fully collusive outcome as an noncooperative Nash equilibrium even in a finitely repeated game. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.