Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and US Tax Competition
Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and US Tax Competition
复制标题
听从领队？
DOI：
10.1177/1091142114527781
复制
发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Timothy J. Goodspeed
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rosanne Altshuler;Timothy J. Goodspeed
本文打破了以往的经验文献，估计纳什税收反应函数的国家政府与其他国家政府竞争，假设竞争对手发挥纳什博弈，并调整到纳什均衡，在每一年。我们质疑这一假设，并利用1968年至2008年的数据探讨一个国家是否在税收竞争中发挥领导作用。我们测试了美国、英国和德国的领导作用，并找到了支持美国领导作用的证据。我们还调查了各国在分水岭税制改革（如1986年美国税收改革法案或1984年英国税收改革）后是否立即做出不同的反应。1986年美国改革后，我们发现一些人支持对美国采取不同的反应，但英国或德国则不然。
This article breaks from the previous empirical literature that estimates Nash tax reaction functions of national governments competing with other national governments assuming that competitors play a Nash game and adjust to a Nash equilibrium in every year. We question this assumption and explore whether one country plays a leadership role in tax competition using data from 1968 to 2008. We test the leadership role of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, and find support for a US leadership role. We also investigate whether countries react differently immediately after watershed tax reforms such as the 1986 US Tax Reform Act or the 1984 UK tax reform. We find some support for a different reaction to the United States following the 1986 US reform, but not for the United Kingdom or Germany.
影响因子：
1.9
作者：
Kelejian, HH;Prucha, IR
通讯作者：
Prucha, IR