COVID-19: Firm Value and Pre-Existing Corporate Governance Regulations
COVID-19: Firm Value and Pre-Existing Corporate Governance Regulations
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3827821
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发表时间：
2021-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Masanori Orihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masanori Orihara
我们发现，由于COVID-19，几乎没有达到COVID-19前自愿最低规定（最低合规者）的日本公司比其他公司损失了更多的公司价值。我们考虑了2015年引入的企业管治守则。它要求公司在遵守或解释的基础上至少有两名外部董事。我们的发现取决于疫情前的流动性：与最低合规者相比，未遵守或过度遵守守则的公司（非最低合规者）的外部董事的相对价值随着疫情前累积的现金持有量而增加。不达标者和超标者之间没有显著差异。董事特征对公司价值也没有影响。采用美国式的董事会制度，这是有选择地提供没有遵守或解释披露，也增加了公司价值。我们的研究结果表明，公司自己的决定，而不是政策诱导的董事会组成，是保护公司价值免受COVID-19爆发等突然冲击的关键。
We find that Japanese firms that barely met a voluntary minimum pre-COVID-19 regulation (minimal compliers) lost more firm value than others due to COVID-19. We consider the corporate governance code introduced in 2015. It requires that firms have at least two outside directors on a comply-or-explain basis. Our finding hinges on pre-pandemic liquidity: the relative value of outside directors for companies that under- or over-complied with the code (non-minimal compliers) compared to minimal compliers increases with cash holdings accumulated pre-pandemic. There are no significant differences between under- and over-compliers. Director characteristics make no difference to firm value either. Adoption of a US-type board system, which is selectively available without comply-or-explain disclosure, also increases firm value. Our findings suggest that a firm’s own decision, not policy-induced board formation, is a key for shielding firm value against a sudden shock like the outbreak of COVID-19.