Remotely Positioned MetaSurface-Drone Attack

Remotely Positioned MetaSurface-Drone Attack
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DOI:
10.1145/3572864.3580343
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发表时间:
2023-02
期刊:
Proceedings of the 24th International Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Zhambyl Shaikhanov;S. Badran;J. Jornet;D. Mittleman;E. Knightly
Zhambyl Shaikhanov;S. Badran;J. Jornet;D. Mittleman;E. Knightly
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
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作者:
Zhambyl Shaikhanov;S. Badran;J. Jornet;D. Mittleman;E. Knightly

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我们首次展示了无线回程链路到空中元表面的安全漏洞。考虑到空中威胁和强大的对手,我们定义并实验证明了“远程定位的MetaSurface-Drone”(RMD)攻击。在攻击中,对手Eve远程接近难以到达的无线回程链路,例如,在塔和屋顶之间,并悄悄地操纵高度定向回程传输的飞行,使远程窃听。为了实现攻击,她设计了一个轻量级的无功耗透射式无人机衍射元表面。探索攻击的基础,我们展示了Eve如何在被拦截的传输上诱导一个秘密的3D衍射辐射束,将其重新用于窃听。我们调查夏娃的误码率(BER)驱动的飞行导航策略,并展示她如何能够适应RMD飞行模式,动态地塑造衍射辐射束,并不断提高她的信号接收在一个遥远的位置。我们实现的攻击,并进行了一系列的初步实验,无线链路100 GHz以上的多GHz宽的带宽。我们的研究结果表明,RMD攻击者可以拦截回程传输几乎为零的BER,同时保持合法通信的影响最小。
We demonstrate for the first time security vulnerabilities of wireless backhaul links to aerial metasurfaces. Considering over-the-air threats and a strong adversary, we define and experimentally demonstrate the "Remotely Positioned MetaSurface-Drone" (RMD) attack. In the attack, the adversary Eve remotely approaches hard-to-reach wireless backhaul links, e.g., between towers and rooftops, and stealthily manipulates highly directive backhaul transmissions on-the-fly, enabling remote eavesdropping. To realize the attack, she designs a lightweight power-free transmissive on-drone diffractive metasurface. Exploring the foundations of the attack, we show how Eve induces a secret 3D diffraction radiation beam on the intercepted transmission, re-purposing it for eavesdropping. We investigate Eve's bit-error-rate (BER)-driven flight navigation strategy and show how she can adapt the RMD flight pattern to dynamically shape the diffraction radiation beam and consistently improve her signal reception at a remote location. We implement the attack and perform a series of preliminary experiments with wireless links above 100 GHz having multi-GHz-wide bandwidth. Our results reveal that the RMD attacker can intercept backhaul transmissions with nearly zero BER while maintaining minimal impact on legitimate communication.