Remotely Positioned MetaSurface-Drone Attack
Remotely Positioned MetaSurface-Drone Attack
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DOI:
10.1145/3572864.3580343
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发表时间:
2023-02
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Zhambyl Shaikhanov;S. Badran;J. Jornet;D. Mittleman;E. Knightly
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文献类型:
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作者:
Zhambyl Shaikhanov;S. Badran;J. Jornet;D. Mittleman;E. Knightly
We demonstrate for the first time security vulnerabilities of wireless backhaul links to aerial metasurfaces. Considering over-the-air threats and a strong adversary, we define and experimentally demonstrate the "Remotely Positioned MetaSurface-Drone" (RMD) attack. In the attack, the adversary Eve remotely approaches hard-to-reach wireless backhaul links, e.g., between towers and rooftops, and stealthily manipulates highly directive backhaul transmissions on-the-fly, enabling remote eavesdropping. To realize the attack, she designs a lightweight power-free transmissive on-drone diffractive metasurface. Exploring the foundations of the attack, we show how Eve induces a secret 3D diffraction radiation beam on the intercepted transmission, re-purposing it for eavesdropping. We investigate Eve's bit-error-rate (BER)-driven flight navigation strategy and show how she can adapt the RMD flight pattern to dynamically shape the diffraction radiation beam and consistently improve her signal reception at a remote location. We implement the attack and perform a series of preliminary experiments with wireless links above 100 GHz having multi-GHz-wide bandwidth. Our results reveal that the RMD attacker can intercept backhaul transmissions with nearly zero BER while maintaining minimal impact on legitimate communication.