Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data
Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data
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DOI：
10.1111/ijet.12295
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发表时间：
2020-11-04
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Katafuchi, Yuya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kurita, Kenichi;Hori, Nobuaki;Katafuchi, Yuya
本文试图对福利计划中的两个难题提出质疑。第一个难题是“不领取福利”，这是指有需要的人不领取福利。第二，有些国家的受益水平高，但受益比例低;有些国家的受益水平低，但受益比例高。我们提出了一个模型的福利耻辱，其中不占用和福利欺诈存在的均衡。这表明，在比较静态中，随着福利水平的提高，受援比率有可能下降。我们的实证结果与理论结果是一致的。
This paper attempts to challenge two puzzles in the welfare program. The first puzzle is "non-take-up welfare," which occurs when needy people do not take up welfare. Second, in some countries, the benefit level is high, but the recipient ratio is low; while the other nations have lower benefit levels but higher recipient ratios. We present a model of welfare stigma in which both non-take-up and welfare fraud exist within the equilibrium. This shows the possibility for the recipient ratio to decrease as the benefit level increases in the comparative statics. Our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical results.