Advertising strategies in a franchise system
Advertising strategies in a franchise system
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2008.09.027
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发表时间：
2009-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Sigué;Pradeep Chintagunta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Sigué;Pradeep Chintagunta
本研究的主要问题是：如果加盟商和加盟商为了各自的利润最大化而采取行动，谁应该承担促销和品牌形象广告？为了解决这个问题，我们研究了一个特许人和两个相邻的特许人之间的两阶段广告博弈。在博弈的第一阶段，特许经营商在三种广告模式中进行选择--集中或委托两种类型的广告给特许经营商，或者只委托促销广告。在第二阶段，根据特许人对广告模式的选择，两个特许人决定是否合作。我们的主要发现是：(1)如果特许人同时委托品牌形象和促销广告或促销广告，则特许人应该合作，尽管特许人之间的合作并不一定会提高特许人的利润。(2)广告安排的选择关键取决于利润率以及进行促销和品牌形象广告的成本。我们还讨论了三种广告模式实施的条件。
The main question of this research is: Who should undertake promotional and brand-image advertising if the franchisor and franchisees act so as to maximize their respective profits? To address this question, we study a two-stage advertising game between a franchisor and two adjacent franchisees. In the first stage of the game, the franchisor chooses between three advertising models – centralizing or delegating the two types of advertising to the franchisees or delegating only promotional advertising. In the second stage, given the franchisor’s choice of an advertising model, the two franchisees decide whether or not to cooperate. Our main findings are that (1) the franchisees should cooperate if the franchisor delegates either both brand-image and promotional advertising or promotional advertising, although cooperation between franchisees does not necessary improve the franchisor’s profits. (2) The choice of an advertising arrangement critically depends on the margins as well as the costs of performing both promotional and brand-image advertising. We also discuss the conditions under which the three advertising models should be implemented.