Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
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扩散环：核不扩散制度的新挑战
DOI：
10.1162/0162288042879959
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发表时间：
2004
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
C. Chyba
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Braun;C. Chyba
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国（朝鲜）、伊朗和巴基斯坦是核不扩散制度面临的三个广泛而相互关联的挑战的最明显的表现。第一种是所谓的潜在扩散，即一个国家遵守或至少在一段时间内保持遵守《不扩散核武器条约》（《不扩散条约》）规定的正式义务的假象，但同时却发展核武器计划所需的能力。或者干脆留在《不扩散条约》内，同时保持迅速实现核武器的潜在能力，以防范未来的威胁。这是朝鲜在其钚计划中所遵循的道路，也是伊朗可能遵循的道路，其他国家也可能更微妙地遵循这一道路。第二大挑战是第二级核扩散，即从私营公司或国家核计划出售或窃取的技术或材料帮助无核武器国家发展非法核武器计划和运载系统。
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The arst is so-called latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains a facade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program.1 That country can then either withdraw from the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons as a hedge against future threats. This was the path followed by the DPRK with its plutonium program and one that is likely being followed by Iran and more subtly by others. The second broad challenge is arst-tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems.2 The third challenge— the focus of this article—is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in Proliferation Rings