Mental set and creative thought in social conflict: Threat rigidity versus motivated focus
Mental set and creative thought in social conflict: Threat rigidity versus motivated focus
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DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.95.3.648
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发表时间：
2008-09-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Nijstad, Bernard A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
De Dreu, Carsten K. W.;Nijstad, Bernard A.
根据传统的威胁-僵化推理，当人们在社会冲突中采取冲突而不是合作的心理定势时，他们的灵活性会降低，创造性会降低，心胸会更加狭窄，思维会更加僵化。作者提出并测试了一种替代的，动机性的焦点帐户，更好地适应现有的证据。作者报告的实验结果与威胁刚性理论不一致，但支持这样一种观点，即人们在冲突中而不是在合作的心理状态下，会更多地将认知资源集中在与冲突相关的材料上：当思维领域与冲突（不）相关时，具有冲突（合作）集的参与者具有更广泛（更小）和更多（更少）包容性的认知类别（实验1a-1b）。此外，他们产生更多，更原始的竞争策略（实验2 - 4），特别是当他们有低，而不是高的认知关闭的需要。冲突理论的影响，有动机的信息处理和创造力的研究进行了讨论。
According to the traditional threat-rigidity reasoning, people in social conflict will be less flexible, less creative, more narrow-minded, and more rigid in their thinking when they adopt a conflict rather than a cooperation mental set. The authors propose and test an alternative, motivated focus account that better fits existing evidence. The authors report experimental results inconsistent with a threat-rigidity account, but supporting the idea that people focus their cognitive re sources on conflict-related material more when in a conflict rather than a cooperation mental set:. Disputants with a conflict (cooperation) set have broader (smaller) and more (less) inclusive cognitive categories when the domain of thought is (un)related to conflict (Experiment 1a-1b). Furthermore, they generate more, and more original competition tactics (Experiments 2 - 4), especially when they have low rather than high need for cognitive closure. Implications for conflict theory, for motivated information processing, and creativity research are discussed.