Reasoning about judgment and preference aggregation
Reasoning about judgment and preference aggregation
复制标题
关于判断和偏好聚合的推理
DOI:
10.1145/1329125.1329228
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Ågotnes T
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ågotnes T
Agents that must reach agreements with other agents need to reason about how their preferences, judgments, and beliefs might be aggregated with those of others by the social choice mechanisms that govern their interactions. The recently emerging field ofjudgment aggregationstudies aggregation from alogicalperspective, and considers how multiple sets of logical formulae can be aggregated to a single consistent set. As a special case, judgment aggregation can be seen to subsume classical preference aggregation. We present a modal logic that is intended to support reasoning about judgment aggregation scenarios (and hence, as a special case, about preference aggregation): the logical language is interpreted directly in judgment aggregation rules. We present a sound and complete axiomatisation of such rules. We show that the logic can express aggregation rules such as majority voting; rule properties such as independence; and results such as the discursive paradox, Arrow's theorem and Condorcet's paradox - which are derivable as formal theorems of the logic. The logic is parameterised in such a way that it can be used as a general framework for comparing the logical properties of different types of aggregation - including classical preference aggregation.
DOI:
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发表时间:
2002
期刊:
International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
影响因子:
--
作者:
J. Lang
通讯作者:
J. Lang
影响因子:
1.5
作者:
M. Pauly
通讯作者:
M. Pauly
DOI:
--
发表时间:
1994
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
Y. Venema
通讯作者:
Y. Venema