A mean-field vaccination game scheme to analyze the effect of a single vaccination strategy on a two-strain epidemic spreading
A mean-field vaccination game scheme to analyze the effect of a single vaccination strategy on a two-strain epidemic spreading
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DOI：
10.1088/1742-5468/ab74c6
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发表时间：
2020-03-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Tanimoto, Jun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arefin, Md Rajib;Kabir, K. M. Ariful;Tanimoto, Jun
我们提出了一个平均场疫苗接种游戏框架，结合了两个不同的过程：同时传播的两种流感样疾病，并通过疫苗接种的基础上，假设一个无限的和混合良好的人口进化博弈论。疫苗被认为是不完美的，因此它对原始（居民）菌株而不是新菌株（突变株）显示出更好的效力。疫苗接种决定发生在流行季节开始时，并取决于疫苗的有效性沿着成本。此外，我们探讨了一种情况下，如果原始菌株不断转换到一个新的菌株通过突变的过程。借助数值实验，我们探讨了接种行为对特定菌株流行的影响。我们的研究结果表明，疫苗接种者的出现可以创造感染流行的新菌株的可能性，如果疫苗不能赋予相当程度的效率对该菌株。另一方面，在大规模疫苗回避下，常驻毒株可以继续占据主导地位。此外，在连续突变的情况下，疫苗对新毒株的效力对控制疾病流行起着关键作用。我们成功地获得了相图，显示了每个菌株的感染分数，最终的流行规模，疫苗接种覆盖率和平均社会收益，考虑到两种不同的策略更新规则，并提供了一个全面的讨论，以获得一个包容的想法，证明接种行为如何影响具有两种菌株的疾病的传播。
We propose a mean-field vaccination game framework that combines two distinct processes: the simultaneous spreading of two strains of an influenza-like disease, and the adoption of vaccination based on evolutionary game theory presuming an infinite and well-mixed population. The vaccine is presumed to be imperfect such that it shows better efficacy against the original (resident) strain rather than the new one (mutant). The vaccination-decision takes place at the beginning of an epidemic season and depends upon the vaccine-effectiveness along with the cost. Additionally, we explore a situation if the original strain continuously converts to a new strain through the process of mutation. With the aid of numerical experiments, we explore the impact of vaccinating behavior on a specific strain prevalence. Our results suggest that the emergence of vaccinators can create the possibility of infection-prevalence of the new strain if the vaccine cannot bestow a considerable level of efficiency against that strain. On the other hand, the resident strain can continue to dominate under large-scale vaccine avoidance. Moreover, in the case of continuous mutation, the vaccine efficacy against the new strain plays a pivotal role to control the disease prevalence. We successfully obtain phase diagrams, displaying the infected fraction with each strain, final epidemic size, vaccination coverage, and average social payoff considering two-different strategy-update rules and provide a comprehensive discussion to get an encompassing idea, justifying how the vaccinating behavior can affect the spread of a disease having two strains.