Extended oligopolies with pollution penalties and rewards
Extended oligopolies with pollution penalties and rewards
复制标题
扩大寡头垄断并给予污染处罚和奖励
DOI：
10.1155/2018/7861432
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hirokazu Takizawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Akio Matsumoto;Ferenc Szidarovszky;Hirokazu Takizawa
考虑一种具有产品差异化的扩展寡头垄断模型。假设政府为该行业选择一个排放标准，并根据每家公司的产量和技术为每家公司选择最大允许排放量。如果实际排放量高于允许的最大排放量，则企业必须向政府支付超出额度的恒定倍数；否则，公司将根据节省的排放量获得类似的奖励。首先证明了存在唯一的内部均衡，然后考察了惩罚或奖励水平和排放标准水平对行业产出的影响，从而对总排放水平的影响。时间延迟被引入到公司必须支付的罚款和公司获得的奖励中。在分析平衡点的稳定性时，既考虑了离散时间尺度又考虑了连续时间尺度。为了数学上的简单性，我们分析了对称公司的情况。在离散情况下，检查了延迟长度的各种值。如果行业总产出足够大，或者企业的共同调整速度足够小，均衡就是稳定的。在连续情况下，要么平衡点总是稳定的，要么当时滞足够小时发生稳定，并且在临界值发生Hopf分叉。
An extendedn‐firm oligopoly with product differentiation is considered. It is assumed that the government selects an emission standard for the industry and based on the output and technology of each firm it selects a maximum allowed amount of emission for each firm. If the actual amount is higher than the allowed maximum, then the firm has to pay a constant multiple of the excess to the government; otherwise it is rewarded similarly based on the saved emission amount. The existence of the unique interior equilibrium is first proved, and then the effect of the level of penalty or reward and that of the emission standard on the industry output and therefore on the total emission level is also examined. Time delay is introduced into the penalties the firms have to pay and into the rewards the firms receive. In analyzing the stability of the equilibrium both discrete and continuous time scales are considered. For mathematical simplicity the case of symmetric firms is analyzed. In the discrete case the various values of the delay length are examined. The equilibrium is stable if either the total industry output is sufficiently large or the common speed of adjustment of the firms is sufficiently small. In the continuous case, either the equilibrium is always stable or stability occurs if the delay is sufficiently small and at the critical value Hopf bifurcation occurs.